

Enhancing Multiple Reliability Measures via Nuisance-extended Information Bottleneck

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
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Nuisance-extended Information Bottleneck (NIB)


Robustness-aware training without relying on specific priors, e.g., augmentation

- Cross-entropy (CE) is prone to extract only a few "shortcuts"
- NIB instead aims to extract every \mathbf{y} -signal in $\mathbf{x} \rightarrow$ can be more reliable under distribution shifts



Motivation: From adversarial to natural corruption


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$$\min_{\hat{\mathbf{x}}} I(\hat{\mathbf{z}} := f(\hat{\mathbf{x}}); \mathbf{y}) \quad \text{subject to} \quad I(\mathbf{x}; \mathbf{y}) = I(\hat{\mathbf{x}}; \mathbf{y}) \quad (*)$$

Goal: Optimizing f via **adversarial training** with respect to (*)?

$$\max_f R_{\text{AT}}(f) := \max_f \left(\min_{\hat{\mathbf{x}}} I(\hat{\mathbf{z}} := f(\hat{\mathbf{x}}); \mathbf{y}) \right),$$

subject to $I(\mathbf{x}; \mathbf{y}) = I(\hat{\mathbf{x}}; \mathbf{y})$

🤔 “Is it possible to solve (*) in practice? If not, how to approximate it?”

💡 No, it is hard: we instead introduce a **nuisance representation** \mathbf{z}_n

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💡 We instead introduce a **nuisance representation** \mathbf{z}_n to model the “remainder”

$$\begin{aligned} \max_f R_{\text{NIB}}(f) &:= I(\mathbf{z}; \mathbf{y}) - I(\mathbf{z}_n; \mathbf{y}) + \alpha I(\mathbf{x}; \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{z}_n) - \beta I(\mathbf{x}; \mathbf{z}) \\ &= R_{\text{IB}}^\beta(f) - I(\mathbf{z}_n; \mathbf{y}) + \alpha I(\mathbf{x}; \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{z}_n) \end{aligned}$$

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Why (N-)IB?

: The objective extends the Information Bottleneck (IB)

$$\Rightarrow R_{\text{IB}}^\beta(f) - I(\mathbf{z}_n; \mathbf{y}) + \alpha I(\mathbf{x}; \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{z}_n)$$


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2. Force \mathbf{z}_n **not to encode** any information related to \mathbf{y} → Let \mathbf{z} do it instead
3. Still, we do not want \mathbf{z}_n to be trivial → Avoid it by rather **compressing out** \mathbf{z}

AE-NIB: A Practical Autoencoder-based Design

We implement NIB based on an “encoder + decoder” architecture:

$$\max_f R_{\text{NIB}}(f) = R_{\text{IB}}^\beta(f) - I(\mathbf{z}_n; \mathbf{y}) + \alpha I(\mathbf{x}; \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{z}_n)$$

Variational IB (VIB) Nuisance loss Reconstruction loss



Experiments: Summary

AE-NIB improves security metrics **with no additional priors** (e.g., augmentation):

1. Natural robustness

- **Corruption robustness:** CIFAR-10/100-C, and ImageNet-C
- **OOD Generalization:** CIFAR-10.1/10.2, CINIC-10, ImageNet-R, and ImageNet-Sketch
- **Background bias:** Backgrounds Challenge [Xiao et al., 2020]

2. Novelty detection

- Standard / Full-spectrum OOD [Yang et al., 2022] benchmarks

3. Certified adversarial robustness [Cohen et al., 2019]

- Certified test accuracy @ radius r

... these and more results can be found in the paper!

[Xiao et al., 2020] Noise or Signal: The Role of Image Backgrounds in Object Recognition, ICLR 2020.

[Hendrycks and Gimpel, 2017] A Baseline for Detecting Misclassified and Out-of-Distribution Examples in Neural Networks. ICLR 2017.


[Yang et al., 2022] Full-Spectrum Out-of-Distribution Detection. 2022.

[Cohen et al., 2019] Certified adversarial robustness via randomized smoothing. ICML 2019.

Experiments: Natural robustness

AE-NIB improves diverse types of robustness without stronger augmentation

- It solely outperforms AugMix and PixMix: Even they use [more data](#) or [augmentation](#)
- The effectiveness of the training could generalize to ImageNet-scale
- It exhibits better trend in clean- vs. corruption accuracy compared to Cross-entropy



Method	C10	C10-C	C10.1	C10.2	CINIC
Cross-entropy	6.08	16.0	13.4	18.3	23.7
VIB [1]	5.98	15.2	13.6	16.8	23.6
NLIB [65]	6.81	17.0	14.6	17.5	24.3
sq-NLIB [106]	6.02	15.5	13.0	17.1	23.7
DisenIB [92]	5.76	15.2	13.2	17.2	23.7
AugMix [39]	6.52	15.1	14.2	17.2	24.2
PixMix [40]	5.43	10.3	13.1	16.6	23.2
AENIB (ours)	4.97	12.3	11.6	15.5	22.2
+ AugMix [39]	5.35	12.0	12.5	15.8	22.6
+ PixMix [40]	4.67	8.08	10.4	14.8	22.1

- (Top) Results on CIFAR-10/-C and CIFAR-variants
- (Upper right) Results on ImageNet and -C/R/Sketch
- (Lower right) Results on Backgrounds Challenge

Dataset	ViT-S/16		ViT-B/16	
	Baseline	AENIB (ours)	Baseline	AENIB (ours)
IN-1K	25.1	25.1	21.8	21.9
IN-C (mCE)	65.9	65.2 (-0.7)	58.6	57.5 (-1.1)
IN-R	70.3	67.1 (-3.2)	66.3	64.4 (-1.9)
IN-Sketch	80.3	77.7 (-2.6)	76.5	74.4 (-2.1)
BG-Challenge	ViT-S/16		ViT-B/16	
Dataset	Baseline	AENIB (ours)	Baseline	AENIB (ours)
ORIGINAL (IN-9; ↑)	95.3	95.5	96.0	96.1
ONLY-BG-T (↓)	20.3	17.8 (-2.5)	24.2	21.1 (-3.1)
MIXED-SAME (↑)	86.3	88.3 (+2.0)	87.4	88.9 (+1.5)
MIXED-RAND (↑)	77.8	80.5 (+2.7)	80.1	81.8 (+0.7)
BG-gap (↓)	8.5	7.8 (-0.7)	7.3	7.1 (-0.2)

[Hendrycks et al., 2020] AugMix: A Simple Data Processing Method to Improve Robustness and Uncertainty. ICLR 2020.

[Hendrycks et al., 2022] PixMix: Dream-like pictures comprehensively improve safety measures, CVPR 2022.

Experiments: Novelty detection

AE-NIB defines a strong OOD score based on the likelihood of $(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{z}_n)$:

$$\text{score}(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{z}_n) := \log \text{Dir}_\alpha(\mathbf{y}) + \log \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{z}_n) \quad \left(\begin{array}{l} \log \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{z}_n; 0, I) = -\frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{z}_n\|^2 \\ \log \text{Dir}_\alpha(\mathbf{y}) = (\alpha - 1) \sum_i \log y_i \end{array} \right)$$

Results on OBJECTS benchmark [Yang et al., 2022]

- OBJECTS = CIFAR-10 (train) + {CIFAR-10-C, ImageNet-10}

FS-OOD: OBJECTS		AUROC (%; \uparrow) / AUPR (%; \uparrow) / FPR@TPR95 (%; \downarrow)			
Method	Score	MNIST	FashionMNIST	Texture	CIFAR-100-C
Cross-entropy	$\max_y p(y x)$ [36]	66.98 / 52.66 / 93.54	73.78 / 90.15 / 88.08	74.18 / 93.34 / 85.64	74.12 / 89.74 / 87.26
	ODIN [73]	70.31 / 49.58 / 82.04	80.98 / 91.53 / 68.73	70.14 / 89.97 / <u>72.91</u>	67.51 / 83.97 / 84.26
	Energy-based [75]	54.55 / 34.14 / 92.23	76.50 / 89.80 / 72.40	68.63 / 89.51 / 75.57	68.37 / 85.54 / 83.64
	Mahalanobis [71]	77.04 / 65.31 / 84.59	80.33 / 92.28 / 77.17	72.02 / 88.46 / 72.98	68.13 / 82.97 / 85.53
	SEM [120]	75.69 / 76.61 / 99.70	79.40 / 93.14 / 93.72	<u>79.69</u> / <u>95.48</u> / 82.15	78.89 / 92.07 / 83.92
	$\log \text{Dir}_{0.05}(\mathbf{y})$	76.75 / 66.26 / 83.51	82.88 / 93.97 / 77.19	70.69 / 92.68 / 91.35	78.80 / 92.21 / 82.50
VIB [1]	$\max_y p(y x)$ [36]	80.23 / 73.50 / 80.69	76.35 / 91.22 / 84.75	74.67 / 94.09 / 87.22	76.12 / 91.03 / 84.99
	$\log \text{Dir}_{0.05}(\mathbf{y})$	86.13 / 79.45 / 64.92	81.11 / 93.12 / 77.82	73.84 / 93.50 / 88.00	78.54 / 91.85 / <u>81.47</u>
AENIB (ours)	$\max_y p(y x)$ [36]	79.67 / 71.50 / 80.22	77.33 / 91.63 / 84.31	74.95 / 93.97 / 86.01	74.31 / 89.89 / 86.26
	$\log \text{Dir}_{0.05}(\mathbf{y})$	<u>90.53</u> / <u>85.68</u> / <u>52.08</u>	<u>84.56</u> / <u>94.61</u> / <u>74.24</u>	75.04 / 93.83 / 86.01	<u>79.39</u> / <u>92.33</u> / 81.51
	$+\log \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{z}_n; 0, I)$	92.43 / 89.38 / 48.10	84.85 / 94.84 / 74.67	88.91 / 97.49 / 48.44	82.66 / 93.62 / 74.14

Summary

TL;DR: **Nuisance modeling** can be a tangible approach for threat-free robust training

Robustness-aware training without relying on domain prior, e.g., data augmentation

- **NIB** aims to extract every **y**-signal in **x** → can be more reliable under distribution shifts
- **AE-NIB** implement NIB with an autoencoder + variational IB architecture

More details can be found:

- Paper: <https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.14096>
- Code: https://github.com/jh-jeong/nuisance_ib

Please drop by our poster session for more information!

- WED-PM-367 / West Building Exhibit Halls ABC